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Chile has had two reprivatization and one privatization processes; however, prior to
both the Chilean economy went through a dramatic questioning and attacking of the
basic principIe of private propeny during the 1970-1973 periodo This highly
conflictive political experience led to the nationalization of industrial fmns and banks,
foreign investment (mainly in CODELCO), land reform, and other state intervention
and expropriation measures (for a review of this period, see Larrain and Meller 1991).
During 1973, public enterprises' share of GDP reached 39 percent; public firms' gross
output share of mining, financial, and public utilities sectors was greater than 85
percent; it reached 70 percent in the transpon and communication sectors; and it was
40 percent in manufacturing (Larroulet 1984).
The military dictatorship, 1973-1990, implied a complete reversal of the ideological
conception that prevailed from 1970-1973. Private propeny and the private sector are
the basic pillars of the present Chilean economic development model. Even Chilean
socialist leaders do not nowadays question private propeny, the free-pricing market
system, or the private sector as the main agents and engines of the economy.
Moreover, the concept of private property is neither mentioned nor is it on the agenda
of any Chilean political pany (including the Communist pany; which received 6.9
percent of the vote in 1992). The current political debate is focused on questioning not
privatizating any of the ten or so remaining public firms and ineludes the rationale for
not privatizating CODELCO.
This paper reviews the reprivatization and privatization processes implemented in the
Chilean economy during the 1970s and the 1980s. Given the fact that Chilean
privatization was carried out in 1986-1987, it is possib1e to examine some preliminary
results achieved by privatized firms with respect to their profitability and employment
performance. Finally, a few paragraphs are devoted to regulation, as it is a new
problem for which there is not much experience. Recently privatized natural
monopolies such as electricity generation have even questioned the concept of
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regulation, claiming that the state should abstain from regulating even natural
monopolies, because such regulation is equivalent to a rebirth of the old role of state
intervention.
The Process of Destatization of the Chilean Econorny
The deep political, institutional, economic, and social crisis of 1973 was used as the
frame of reference for a complete reversal of the development strategy and the role of
the state in the Chilean economy. From 1973 on, the state and the public sector were
considered the main generators of most of the problems of the Chilean economy;
therefore, the smaller the size of the state and the smaller its degree of intervention, the
more improved would be social welfare.
The many stabilization and structural reforms implemented during the military
regime-like privatization and reprivatization, state and fiscal reforms, liberalization,
deregulation, and the opening of the external sector (table l)-have had as a goal the
reduction, and eventually the elimination, of policies and mechanisms available to the
state that might allow it to modify optimal economic growth generated by market
forces. This type of environment was to give incentives to the private sector to become
the engine of growth. The explicit economic philosophy during the 1973-1990 period
was that in a laissez faire, free market system, the fundamental role of the state was the
maintenance of law and order. This implied, among other things, protection of private
property and enforcement of legal contracts.
Other objectives complemented the foregoing: (1) modernization of the state
structure, which implied a reduction and simplification of red tape, and elimination of
many existing public control measures; moreover, the efficiency of the public sector
had to be improved; (2) the maintenance of an equilibrium in the macroeconomic
environment, with stable and permanent rules, became the main responsibility of the
state; in this way, the private sector would be able to perform a correct microeconomic
evaluation of its investment projects; (3) the state should not be involved in the
production of goods and services (including social goods like housing for the poor,
health, and education).
In the implementation of the Chilean laissez faire, free market system, it is useful to
distinguish state reforms implemented in the 1970s and in the 1980s.
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State Reforms in the 1970s
A schematic overview of the 1970-1973 Chilean economic situation may lead to a
better understanding of the deep reforms implemented by the military regime during
the 1970s. During the Unidad Popular government (1970-1973), the state assumed a
large economic roleo In the productive sphere, there was a massive transfer of real
assets from the private to the public sector; the mechanisms that were used included
nationalization of large copper mines, agrarian reform, nationalization of the banking
system, and creation of the so-called social property area (which implied public control
of the most important productive firms). Sharp increases in public expenditure through
augmentation of public employment and real wages occurred; in addition, there was a
large expansion of social expenditures. Control mechanisms, for example, generalized
price controls, credit allocation and interest rate controls, foreign exchange and import
controls, became the main tools of economic policy. It should be pointed out that these
control mechanisms existed prior to 1970, but their use was considerably intensified
during the Unidad Popular government.
In 1973 the overall public sector deficit reached 30 percent of GDP. There was a
proliferation of black markets and economic changes, and the inflation rate reached 60
percent (a level of inflation unknown before then).1 This seriously deteriorated
econornic situation constituted the basis for implementing drastic changes.
As already pointed out, the policy reforms were supposed to lead toward a
permanent dirninution of the econornic role of the state. In the productive sphere, there
was a massive transfer of real and financial assets toward the private sector through
reprivatization and privatization.2 Fiscal reform included a significant reduction of
public expenditure and a tax reformo These measures generated important fiscal
surpluses at the end of the 1970s. Economic liberalization and deregulation, that is,
elimination of almost all existing (econornic) control s, took place.
Table 1 provides a synthesis of the economic reforms implemented during the
1970s.3 Table 2 provides the intertemporal sequence of the implementation of these
reforms; the lower part of table 2 provides values for inflation, unemployment, and
growth, the macroeconornic environment prevailing during the reforms. In this essay 1
will examine only the reprivatization process.
The first reprivatization process occurred in 1974; 257 firms and around 3,700
farms that had been illegally seized or intervened by the state (or by the workers) were
quickly returned to the old owners. This reprivatization process did not involve any
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monetary transaction; fonner owners were asked not to start any legal or judicial action
against the state, and they were also required to absorb existing debts.
Table 1. Chilean Major Structural Policy Reforms of the 1970s
1972-1973
More than 500 commercial fmns





Multiple exchange rate system
Prohibitions and quotas on imports
High tariffsa
Prior deposits for imports
Controlled interest rates
State ownership of banks
Control of credit
Total control of capital movements
Government was the main external
borrower




High and increasing nonwage labor
costs (40 percent of wages)
Post-1973
Privatization
By 1980. only 45 firms (including and banks
one bank) remained in the public sector
Prices
Market-determined prices except
wages and exchange cate
Fiscal Regime
Value-added tax of 20 percent
Public employment reduced
Fiscal surpluses in 1979-1981
Trade and Exchange Rates
Homogeneous. unified exchange rate
Flat import tariff of 10 percent (excluding
automobiles)




Liberalization of capital markets
Capital Mobility
Gradualliberalization of the capital
accountb
Private sector is the main external borrower
Labor Regime
No unions and no collective bargaining
power
Relaxation of prohibition on dismissals
Relaxation of mandatory wage adjustments
and severe cuts in real wages
Reduction of nonwage labor costs
(to 3 percent of wages)
aThe average tariff was 105 percent and the maximum was 750 percent.
bMovements of long-term capital were liberalized in 1981. and those of short-term capital in 1982.
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1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Inflation (%) 369 343 198 84 37 38 31 9
Unemployrnent 9 16 19 18 17 17 17 16
(%)
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Table 2. Phasing of Chilean Reforms during the 70s
There was another reprivatization process from 1974-1978 which included specific
monetary transactions. This involved the dismantling of the "social property area"
created under the Unidad Popular government. At the end of 1973, more than five
hundred firms and banks were under state control; by the end of the 1970s, only forty-
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five finns (including one bank) belonged to the public sector; the rest had been
"reprivatized. "
The 1970s reprivatization process occurred in the middle of a deep recession (in
1975, GDP declined 12.9 percent). At that time, Chile also had a very small domestic
capital market. Thus only a few private agents were able to panicipate in the
reprivatization process. This situation led to an acute concentration of property and the
formation of a few conglomerates ("economic groups"), which dominated the
economy through the ownership or control of the main finns and banks. The state
received US$543 million from the sale of banks and finns (see Larrain [1991] for
details). It has been estimated that there was a 30 percent subsidy given by the state in
the fonn of the underpricing of reprivatized banks and finns (Foxley 1982).4 Most of
these finns were acquired with an initial down payment equivalent to 10-20 percent of
the total costs; CORFO (a public institution) provided the credit for the remaining parto
Propeny concentration of reprivatized finns was a deliberate goal of the economic
authorities, and it was achieved through the sale of large share packages, up to 100
percent, of a given finn or bank. It was believed that this procedure would result in
higher prices for reprivatized flI1t1s(and banks). Many of these reprivatized finns and
banks went bankrupt during the 1982-1983 recession. They were then intervened and
rescued by the state and underwent a second reprivatization during the rnid-1980s.
State Reforms in the 19805
State refonns in the 1980s consolidated and deepened the refonns of the 1970s; that
is, there was further reduction of the role of the state in the economy. The refonns of
the 1980s included (1) in the productive (and financia}) sphere, a second
reprivatization process and a widespread privatization of traditional public enterprises;
moreover, there was a social security refonn under which the old "equal for all"
pension system (administered by the public sector) was replaced by a personal
capitalization system administered by the private sector; (2) new tax refonn oriented
toward a reduction in the size of the public sector; and (3) the establishment of the
autonomy of the Central Bank. 1 shall examine the privatization and reprivatization
processes in only a schematic way in this paper; the next sections will deal with
specific issues related to these processes.
There were some lessons learned from the first reprivatization. That process was
realIy debt-Ied, where the newly reprivatized firms started with quite large debt/equity
Table 3. Second Reprivatization Process 1984-1987
Book Value
Reprivatization Mechanism 01 Assets Number 01
Firms & Financial Prívate Popular (Sept. 1987) Shareholders
1nstitutionsa Auction Capitalism (US$ millions) (Sept. 1987)
COPEC X 310 15,922
Banco de Chile X 285 39,179
Banco de Santiago X 156 15,919
INFORSA X 85 3,447
Pesquera Coloso 47 6,340
INDUS X 45 5,158
Banco de Concepción X 44 6,110
AFP Provida X X 18 7,909
AFP Santa María X X 13 6,062
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ratios, which generated a highly unstable financial position (Larrain 1991). Tbe high
concentration of property and interlocking decisions of firms and banks also made
most of the Chilean private productive and financial structures depend on the
appropriate management of the two largest economic conglomerates.
The second reprivatization process (1984-1987) inc1uded firms, banks, and
financial institutions that were rescued from bankruptcy in 1982-1983. The net stock
value of these enterprises has been estimated to be US$1.1 billion (equivalent to 6
percent GDP; Hachette and Lüders 1988) (see table 3). In this second reprivatization
process, distinct sale procedures were used: "popular capitalism,"S stock exchange,
and bidding among prequalified buyers. All of these transactions (except those in the
popular capitalism program) required 100 percent cash payments; in this way, the
previous debt-Ied reprivatization problem was avoided. Moreover, this time there was
Source: Hachette and Lüders (1988).
aSee Hachette and Lüders (1988) for the complete list of reprivatized firms and banks; the list shown
here includes those having the largest asset book value figures.
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a specific objective for the dissemination of property. From a political point of view,
this would ensure the irreversibility of the whole reprivatization process.
The privatization of public enterprises began in 1986. Divestiture of public
enterprises (all of them created by the state) included public utility firms (electricity,
telephones and cornmunications, gasoline distribution) and other firms like the national
airline (LAN), the steel company (CAP), and nitrate and coal companies. The total
value of the stock assets of the programmed divestment process (excluding
CODELCO, the large state copper mines) has been estimated to be US$3.6 billion
(Hachette and Lüders, 1988).
Different procedures were used for the divestiture of Chilean public enterprises:6
institutional capitalism, through which the new privately administered social security
firms (AFP) were able to acquire restricted amount of shares; "employees' capitalism,"
in which workers of divested public firms received special incentives (through price
subsidies) for buying shares of the companies in which they worked; "traditional
capitalism," which consisted of the sale of packages of shares to qualified buyers
through direct auction or through the stock exchange. The sale of divested public firms
generated US$l.1 billion. The subsidy implicitly provided by the government in this
divestiture process was higher than 50 percent (Marcel 1989). Again, all these
privatization transactions required cash payment of 100 percent of the total costo
Furthermore, there was the explicit purpose in mind of disseminating property, to
include investors and workers, people in general, without any discrimination between
domestic and foreign investors.
Given the fragility of the Chilean financial system and its bad performance during
the 1970s, several regulations and changes were introduced during the 1980s:7 (1) the
Superintendency of Banks introduced a rating system of a given bank's loan portfolio
according to the degree of risk; then, a specific bank was required to provide reserves
according to the default risk of its loan portfolio; (2) a restriction was established on
the level of loans a bank could provide to a client related to the owners of the bank; in
this respect, allloans provided to distinct enterprises that belong to the same group of
shareholders would be considered as one loan and therefore subject to the loan limit
established with respect to total bank assets; (3) the Superintendency of Securities and
Insurance established new roles for joint-stock corporation with respect to the
disclosure of transactions between related companies, sales and purchases of stocks
by important shareholders and managers, requirement of consolidated financial
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balance sheets, and penalties for publication of false or misleading information;
moreover, a risk rating of all securities issues by private (and public) firms was
introduced; also, a law established the definition of a conglomerate and of a controlling
group of shareholders; (4) mutual funds and insurance companies now have
requirements about portfolio diversification that specify limits on investment in
securities of one issuer or related issuers; in addition, there are requirements related to
information disdosure, net worth, and technical reserves.
Privatization Mechanisms of Public Enterprises
Privatization of public enterprises (during the 1980s) implied a deepening and
consolidation of the role of the private sector in the Chilean economy. Public
enterprises were a key agent in the previous development strategy. They had been
created to provide cheap intermediate goods and cheap public utilities to the import-
substitution industries. Given indivisibilities and scale economies, some of these
industries were quite large and, during the 1940s and 1950s, only the state was
willing to invest in their creation. Therefore, divestiture of these public enterprises was
really the final blow to the old development strategy. With the exception of CODELCO
and a few other firms, the rest of the Chilean economy at the beginning of the 1990s
was in private hands. Moreover, the privatization of CODELCO is now a hot issue. In
1972, all political parties fully agreed on the nationalization of CODELCO; today, the
question many people ask is: What are the reasons for not privatizing CODELCO?
Table 4 provides a list of the public enterprises that were privatized during the 1986-
1989 period, with the percentages of ownership that were soldo By 1990, around 30
public enterprises were almost 100 percent sold; these included a steel refining
company (CAP, 7,000 workers); public electricity generation, transmission, and
distribution utilities (ENDESA, 2,900 workers; ENERSIS, 2,500 workers; Chilgener
and Chilquinta, 1,750 workers); telephone (CTC, 7,000 workers); telecom-
munications (ENTEL, 1,400 workers); a nitrate company (SOQUIMICH, 4,700
workers); a coal mine enterprise (Schwager, 2,300 workers); a sugar refinery
(IANSA, 2,000 workers); and the national airline (LAN, 900 workers).
As was mentioned previously, different mechanisms were used in the privatization
of Chilean public firms; these mechanisms were used even in the privatization of the
same firm (see table 4). It was required that a public firm be transformed through a
legal procedure into a corporation able to sell shares; its accounting and financial
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operations would then become subject to the regulation procedures of the
Superintendency of Securities and Insurance. Medium and large public finns were
privatized by the sale of packages of shares. The buyers were domestic and foreign
investors, pension funds (AFP), employees of the same firms, and the public in
general. In the case of small public finns, a simpler procedure was used. All shares
were sold in one package to a qualified buyer, who could be either a domestic or a
foreign investor, or the finn's employees.
Table 4. Privatization of Chilean Public Firms 1986-1990
Public Firm Activity Privatization Percentage
1986 1987 1990
Privatization Mechanisms















































































































































































































Let us review In more detail the distinct privatization mechanisms.8 In the
employees' capitalism system, shares of the privatized firm were sold directly to the
employees working in that firm; in only a few cases, like ENDESA (the largest
electricity-generating firm; see table 4), other employees of the public sector were also
able to acquire shares. In general, employees were allowed to buy 5-10 percent of
total shares. To induce these employees to buy the shares, they were sold at a
subsidized price with a guarantee that the firm could buy them back at the employee's
retirement at a price at least equal (in real terms) to the price the employee had paid.
Moreover, the workers could use the money accumulated in the firm's pension fund to
buy the shares. In short, employees of the divested firms received the offer to buy
their own company's shares "at a price lower than the market, without putting down
any money and without running any risk" (Hachette and Lüders 1992). As has been
pointed out, the rationale for this mechanism was to obtain political support for the
process of privatization. As a by-product, this process also achieved the goal of
dissemination property shares.
The institutional capitalism privatization system allowed the private pension funds
(AFP) to acquire a regulated amount of shares in privatized firms. The participation of
the AFP in the privatization process ensured property dissemination. There has,
however, been a dual con cero with respect to the AFP role, which explains the strict
regulations imposed. On the one hand, no risks to the functioning of the newly
privatized pension fund management system (AFP) could be allowed; the political cost
of its failure was too large. A Superintendency of AFP was created. It supervises and
regulates the fund's portfolio and imposes limits on its composition, that is, the
amount or percentage of each type of investment (bank deposits, bonds, shares) of
each AFP. Moreover, there is a special Risk Evaluation Committee (seven members,
four from the private sector and three from the public sector) that evaluates the risks
related to the portfolio of each AFP. Only 5 percent of the portfolio of each AFP can
comprimise shares of the privatized firms. There are also limits on the percentage of
shares that can be acquired in a specific firmo On the other hand, the resources
accumulated in the AFPs are large compared to the size of the Chilean domestic capital
market; by 1990, the AFP had accumulated 15 percent of GDP. Therefore, the
participation of the AFP in the stock exchange had to be gradual to avoid abrupt
fluctuations in share prices. In spite of all these limitations and regulations, the AFP
acquired in 1990 around 25 percent of the shares of the privatized firms.
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Foreign investors participated in the Chilean divestiture process mainly through
stock market auctions. In this case, up to 10 percent of equity could be bought through
a broker or directIy on the stock market floor. It should be pointed out that no single
foreign buyer acquired a controlling portion of equity through this stock exchange
mechanism (Sáez 1992). The mechanism foreign investors used to acquire majority
ownership of privatized enterprise was an open auction. For example, in the case of
the large telephone company (CTC), there was an open international auction for 51
percent of the shares.
The privatized enterprises in which foreign investors have acquired shares are:9
CTC, Chilgener, Enaex, IANSA, LAN, Pilmaiquén, and Telex (see table 4 for
identification of the firm activity). Foreign investors paid for shares mostIy through
debt-for-equity swaps. With the exception of CTC, no restrictions or requirements
were established for foreign investor participation. In the case of CTC, the
international auction required that the buyer invest US$200 million in a program
designed to increase the availability of telephone lines.
Criticism of Chilean Privatization
Distinct aspects of the Chilean privatization process have been criticized. In fact, this
process was implemented under a dictatorship without any public discussion about its
rationale and its implementation mechanisms; moreover, the speed of the process was
so great that many public enterprises were privatized in under two years (see table 4).
Marcel (1989) has compared the U.K. and Chilean privatization experiences and
shows that, in relative terms, the annual flow of revenues generated by the Chilean
public firms' divestiture process has been more than twice as large and much more
rapid than in the United Kingdom (table 5). These figures also indicate the key role
played by privatization in balancing Chile's budget.
The divestiture of some of the largest privatized firms, like CAP and ENDESA, has
been unclear. Let us look at each case separately (for further details, see Marcel [1989]
and Hachette and Lüders [1992]). CORFO (a public institution) owned 89 percent of
the equity in CAP in March 1986. At that time, CORFO decided to seU about 65
percent of the total shares to CAP; the "preferential" price that CAP paid per share
(during the March-June periad) was US$ 0.25, while the average stock market price
was US$ 0.31 in May 1986 and US$ 0.39 in June 1986. CORFO then proceeded to





percentage ownership of CAP to 51 percent, while the previous private investors
increased their ownership from 17 percent to 49 percent in three months, paying $72
million for a package of shares that fifteen months later (September 1987) was valued
at $194 million (see table 4).
In the case of the privatization of ENDESA, its high debt/capital ratio did not make its
shares very attractive. To solve this problem, ENDESA issued $500 million in shares,
which were all bought by CORPO; CORFO paid $28.92 per share while the average
monthly market price share of ENDESA during 1986 was $13.81, with a range of
$6.40 to $20.00 (see Hachette and Lüders 1992 for ENDESA monthly price shares
during the 1985-1989 period; there is no value higher than $22.60, and the median
value is $16.20). Through this procedure, ENDESA's debt-capital ratio was reduced
from 2.61 (prior to the CORFO operation) to 0.77 (after the CORFO operation). In
short, the privatization of ENDESA was carried out by transferring an important part
of its debt to the public sector (CORPO).









aAverage annual fIows for the periodo
The effective sale price of some privatized firms has also been criticized (for a more
detailed discussion, see MarceI1989). Using different valuation procedures, like book
value, stock exchange valuation, and present value estimation, Marcel (1989)
estimates that the capitalloss of the Chilean public sector from divestiture of the twelve
largest public firms (1986-1987) fluctuated between 50 percent and 64 percent (table
6) of total asset value of those fmns; this is greater than 4 percent of GDP in 1987.
AIso criticized has been the decision to allow foreign investors to participate in the
divestiture process. Foreign investors were allowed to use Chilean external debt
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certificates (debt equity swaps), available at a 30 percent to 40 percent discount on the
secondary market during 1986-1987, which the Central Bank then redeemed at par
value. In this way, foreign investors received a double subsidy--on the domestic price
of the assets themselves and on the devalued exchange rateo
Does foreign investment require such large incentives before it comes to Chile? In
fact, there has been relatively active participation by foreign investors. In the
reprivatization process they acquired 40 percent and 51 percent, respectively, of the
two largest private social security funds (Provida and Santa María; see table 3). The
usual argument for the benefits of foreign direct investment is that it introduces new
technology, new machinery, and new know-how, and opens new export markets.
One may well ask which of these is being provided by the foreign investors' majority
participation in Chile's largest AFPs.
Table 6. Capital Loss of Chilean Public Sector from Divestiture of
Twelve Public Firms, 1986-1987
Melhod % wilh RespecllO Public Firm's AsselS
Asse~ 50.0
Stock exchange valuationb 63.7
Present valuec 56.9
Source: Marcel (1989).
aThe asset method corresponds to the measurement of Ihe effective sale price with respect to the
accounting book value procedure.
bThe sale price of the shares of privatized firms is compared to the stock exchange valuation
(September 1987).
cAn average real rate of retum of 6 percent is used from 1990 on.
Another problem is that divestiture of public firms has been so rapid that there has
not been time to establish a regulatory framework within which the natural monopolies
will operate. Neither is it clear what role the large institutional investors, such as the
private social security funds, will have.
In spite of some of the criticisms mentioned, however, the new democratic
government has clearly stated that there will not be a reversal of the privatization
process, and that there will not be any official revision of the privatization procedures
that were implemented and completed by the military regime. Moreover, the wide
2.3a 4.6 8.8 10.6 4.7
10.9 12.3a 17.2 12.4
9.5a 9.8 14.1 21.7 29.7
8.2a 8.6 12.1 18.4 18.4
5.8 3.oa 7.5 8.0 8.9
4.9 12.3a 7.3 6.1
35.4 39.0 45.5a 45.6 38.8
5.5 7.0 37.4a 57.2 37.3
12.7 14.9 28.9a 23.5 3.4
12.8 8.2 9.3 11.3a -19.0
10.4 5.2 3.9a 3.1 -D.5








dissemination of ownership (direct and indirect, through the AFPs) of both the
privatized and the reprivatized companies creates a constituency that will be opposed to
any reversal.
Some Preliminary Results from Privatized Firms
Even though only a few years have passed since the Chilean privatization process,
some features can be pointed out in relation to profitability and employment.
From the point of view of profitability, let us consider the average rate of return
observed in 1989-1990 for a set of selected large privatized firms (see table 4 for book
values). Table 7 shows the following: there are three firms (Chilmetro-Enersis,
ENTEL, IANSA) that show rates of return higher than 20 percent in both years; four
firms (CTC, Chilquinta, Lab. Chile, SOQUIMICH) have average rates of return
higher than 10 percent; three firms (CAP, Chilgener, ENDESA) show rates of return
in the 6 percent to 8 percent range; two firms (LAN, Schwager) showe negative rates
of return in 1990.
Table 7. Rate of Return of Selected Privatized Firms (%)




















Note: Rate ofreturn calculated from net income (after tax profits) oyer shareholdcr's equity.
aYear of priyatization when priyate inyestors' ownership was higher than 50 pcrcent.
In short, (1) privatized firms two years after privatization show higher rates ofreturn
than they had when they were public firms; (2) many privatized firms show relatively
Table 8. Employment in Selected Privatized Firms (Number of Employees)
Enterprise 1970 1979 1983 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Enersis-Chilmetro 2,495a 2,587 2,828 2,962 3,052
Chilquinta 983a 956 770 746 731
SOQUIMICH 10,814 7,109 4,096 4,704a 5,024 5,527 5,453 4,111
Chilgener 760 852a 837 845 876
CTC 5,887 7,206 6,338 6,938 7,374 7,518a 7,36 7,530
ENDESA 6,512 4,270 2,705 2,905 2,828 2,925a 2,980 2,833b
Entel 1,161 1,236 1,338 1,402 1,456 1,4~ 1,546 1,547
lANSA 2,827 1,597 1,079 2,027 2,103 2,023a 2,144 2,163
Lab. Chile 567 527 592 618 681a 749 728
LAN 3,608 2,059 1,372 88 983 1,093 1,43oa 1,551
Schwager 2,264 2,277 2,296a 2,304 2,171
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high rates of return, that is, higher than 10 percent; (3) there are a few privatized finns
that are showing financial problems, that is, privatization of some finns may not have
solved the economic difficulties they had when they were publico
Union leaders in Latin America have, in general, opposed privatization of public
finns, fearing that after public divestiture many employees would lose their jobs. lt is
commonly believed that privatized firms will employ fewer workers than the
equivalent public ones, because political pressures generate overstaffing in the public
sector.
Table 8 provides the evolution of employment for selected privatized finns before
and after privatization. When comparing levels two and four years before and after
privatization (in 1986), one observes the following:
1. There are more privatized firms showing an increase in employment than a
decrease. CTC, ENTEL, IANSA, LAN, Lab. Chile, Chilgener, and Enersis have
higher employment levels after privatization than before. On the other hand,
ENDESA, Chilquinta, and Schwager show lower employment levels after
privatization. It is not clear how SOQUIMICH should be classified according to the
changes observed in its employment level.
Source: Sáez (1992).
aYear of privatization when private investors ownership was higher than 50percent.
bIn January 1991, this enterprise was reorganized and as a result 434 employees wcre permanently laid
off.
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2. Nine out of eleven privatized finns show higher employment levels one year after
privatization (table 8); however, in this case, it could be argued that the public firm
was being prepared (by reducing its employment level) to make privatization more
attractive. Therefore, the previous comparison is more relevant.
3. Most of the privatized firms have an increase in employment of less than 7.0
percent. In the three privatized finns in which there was a contraction of employment,
this decrease was higher than 12.0 percent.
4. Comparing the employment level of the privatization year with 1990 for the
eleven firms, we observe the following (table 8): seven privatized firms showing an
increase of employment, have created 988 new jobs, which represent 6 percent of their
initial employment level (16,459 jobs). Four privatized firms have had an employment
contraction equivalent to 1,496; that is, the percentage of jobs lost is 13.7 percent of
the initial employment level (10,908 jobs). The net result of the employment impact of
the eleven privatized finns is a reduction of employment of 508 jobs, which represents
1.9 percent of the total initial (year of privatization) employment level.
Final Remarks
Chilean privatization processes provide some generallessons. In my judgment, these
are the following.
The Chilean reprivatization process of the 1970s showed that privatized firms could
go bankrupt (1) if privatization was a highly debt-Ied process, or, (2) if there existed a
high degree of interlocking between productive and financial enterprises. In many
Latin American countries, private firms do not go bankrupt; rather, they are rescued by
the state. In Chile, reprivatized firms went bankrupt and were rescued by the state; in
this way, heavy private losses were socialized.
Using rates of return as indicators of efficiency, it could be said that privatized firms
have been, in general, much more efficient than they were as public fmns. We have to
expect that in some cases, however, privatized firms will not be able to overcome
previous inefficiency problems; therefore, let us not emphasize the bad experiences
and forget the successful ones.
The fall of employment in privatized firms does not seem to be a general problem;
that is, it is not a general rule that privatized firms' employment drops. The reduction
of employment could be a serious problem in certain firms; in which case, there
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should be a policy focus (for example, retraining of displaced workers) in those
specific firms.
For polítical and income redistribution purposes, ít is important to incorporate
workers and low-income groups into the privatization process. The Chilean experience
provides some mechanisms that were used even under the military dictatorship. The
Chilean experience also shows, however, that privatization has been mainly a highly
regressive asset-redistribution process.
Regulation of natural privatized monopolies (Le., the public utilities) will become a
highly conflictive issue because the Chilean state: (1) has neither the expertise nor the
know-how to regulate, (2) there is no clear regulatory framework, and (3) there are no
trained regulators. This sítuation will generate problems with the evolution of public
utility prices and with the level of future investment in public utilities.
There are distinct aspects related to the role of foreign investment in recent Chilean
economic history. First, during the economic recovery of the 1980s, public investment
played the leading role followed by foreign investment; only later on, did private
domestic investment start to increase, after domestic investors realized that foreign
investors were picking up the most profitable projects. Second, from a Latin American
perspective, foreign firms have several positive features: they bring capital, modern
technology, and modern know-how, and open up new external markets. Moreover,
some of them bring a better entrepreneur-worker relationship to the firmoThrough the
demonstration effect, this fact has a positive impact on the domestic economy.
Something similar could be said with respect to the relatively higher ecological concero
ofU.S. and European firms.
Some lessons from the past, however, show that there exists a conflict between a
foreign multinational firm's profit-maximization objective at the globallevel and the
host country's objective (for example, Chile's objective with respect to foreign
investment in large copper mining), which is related to national income maximization.
Output expansion by the foreign firm over domes tic GDP could be the best way to
avoid such conflicto
A different problem is related to the free entry and exit of short-run speculative
capital. Given the relatively small size of the Chilean financial market, these short-run
capital flows could have serious macrodestabilizing effects and could thus affect
domestic perception with respect to long-run foreign investment.
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Finally, in Chile, the old development model is gone. The present Chilean economic
model-free-market, open economy, exported-oriented, private sector-Ied-will
continue. This is not a 360-degree move. Chile has already leamed and appreciated the
advantages of the market mechanism and its integration into the world economy. There
exist many new prívate dome stic entrepreneurs who are helping to increase exports,
investment, and growth. There were only a few before. There are still key problems
that have to be solved however; the new role of the state (Le., the public sector-prívate
sector relationship), and the improvement of poverty and income distribution.
Notes
The author acknowledges the useful comments received from William Maloney and Miguel Ramírez;
usual caveats are valido
1. For a more elaborate review and analysis of the economic problems during the Unidad Popular
governmcnt, see Larrain and Meller (1991).
2. The use of the terms "privatization" and "reprivatization" here follows conventional usage in Chile:
firms divested after previously being acquired by the state through direct intervention or purchase, or
firms that were previously seized by the state without compensation are said to be "reprivatized";
public firms, originally crcatcd by the state, which are divested correspond lo the "privatization"
concept. For a more detailed review of this subject, see Foxley (1982), Hachelle and Lüders (1988),
Mareel (1989), Larrain (1991).
3. For a more detailed analysis of these rcforms, see Foxlcy (1982), Ffrench-Davis (1982), Harberger
(1982), Zahler (1983), Ramos (1984), WalLOn(1985), Edwards and Cox (1987).
4. For a diffcrcnt view on this issue, see Hachcue and Lüdcrs (1988).
5. Undcr popular capitalism the government sold the shares of reprivatized firms at prices below thcir
market value, providing 95 percent of lhe credil at zero real interest. Buyers could dcduCl fram lheir
income tax up to 20 percenl of the lotal value of the transaction the following year. Buyers facing a
marginal tax rate grealer than or equallo 30 pcrcent got a tax credit greater than their down payment.
In short, the government paid some of the buyers to acquire the shares. Given the benefits, thcre was
a limit on the amount of shares one individual could buy. The two largest private banks (Banco de
Chile and Banco Santiago) and the two largest AFPs (Santa Maria and Provida) (each had belonged LO
the two largest conglomerales) were reprivatized using the popular capitalism system. Fifty-five
thousand shareholders participated in this system by the end of 1987 (see table 3).
6. For more details, see Mareel (1989), Hachette and Lüders (1992), Sáez (1992).
7. For more details, see Ramírez (1989) & Sáez (1992).
8. For a more detailed discussion, see Mareel (1989) and Hacheue and Lüders (1992).
9. In most sales of shares through the stock market, it is not possible lo identify domestic and forcign
investors.
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